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Abstract 
 
Global income taxation in the country of residence is a legal dogma of international taxation. 
We question this dogma from the perspective of relations with developing countries from a 
legal and economic perspective, and make a modern and fair proposal for tax treaties. We will 
show under which conditions a developing and a developed country will voluntarily sign a tax 
treaty where information is exchanged truthfully and whether they should share revenues. 
Moreover, we will demonstrate how the conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the 
implementation of a tax audit system. 
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1 Motivation
Global income taxation in the country of residence is a global legal dogma of in-
ternational taxation (see Mc Daniel (2007); Fleming et al. (2009)). Conceived
to fit relations between countries with symmetrical flows of capital, this dogma
gradually spread throughout the world (see Christians (2010)). We question this
result from the perspective of relations with developing countries for two reasons.
From a legal perspective, expanding the taxing sovereignty beyond the national
borders leads to overlaps with the sovereignty of the state of source and interna-
tional double taxation may arise. From an accounting perspective, the deduction
of the foreign tax by the country of residence1, reduces the possibilities of devel-
oping countries to attract foreign capital through tax policy. A reduction of such
tax by the country of source turns into a lower deduction against taxes due in the
country of residence. This achieves capital export tax neutrality, but prevents the
reduction of taxes by countries that wish to attract foreign capital.
This paper regards this outcome in conflict with international tax justice and
a fair allocation of taxing powers (see Pistone & Goodspeed (2010)). In particu-
lar, in the presence of unidirectional flows of income or capital, as for the relations
with developing countries, worldwide income taxation by the country of residence
allows in fact capital exporting countries to link up to their taxing jurisdiction
income that has in fact been sourced or produced outside of it and thus interfere
with the tax policy decisions of the country in connection with whose territory
income was generated.
The features of this policy can be summarized as follows (see Brooks (2007); Pi-
stone (2010)): When - as it is often the case - taxes levied in the developing
1i.e. relief for juridical double taxation by the so-called foreign tax credit method.
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country are lower than those applicable in the developed country, the latter will
in fact levy its own taxes on income produced on the territory of the developing
country under the noble justification that this will discourage developing countries
from negotiating a race to the bottom with powerful multinational enterprises.
Remarkably, however, developed countries often abstain themselves from compen-
sating their more favorable domestic tax regimes, giving rise to some problems of
compatibility with the non-discrimination principle under EU law. The even more
remarkable effects of this international scenario is that multinational enterprises
are stimulated to invest in complex (and expensive) international tax planning
schemes in order to repatriate the investment of their capital through high tax
jurisdictions that exempt foreign source income and an appropriate use of the di-
versity of tax treaties around the world (see Commission (2009) ).
The limited dialogue between legal and economic experts of taxation has so far lead
to the conclusion that tax treaties have a limited impact on FDI. The first paper
in the economic literature on the relationship between double tax agreements and
foreign direct investment finds that there is a positive impact of US FDI towards
other countries if a tax treaty has been signed (Barthel et al. (2010)). This result
has been contested in the literature by an influential paper by Neumayer (2006),
who concludes that treaties intend to reduce tax evasion rather than promote FDI.
Based on a large international panel, Voget et al. (2011) have shown that double
tax agreements exhibit a positive and significant impact on foreign direct invest-
ment. All of these results are based on the assumption, indeed very questionable
from a legal perspective, that tax treaties present only marginal differences among
them and can be streamlined along the patterns of model tax conventions (Lang
et al. (2010)).
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The evidence of in- and outbound investment concerning some tax havens and
their relations with some developing countries can give an idea of how a modern
view, that takes information sharing seriously, of the problem is needed, bringing
together legal and economic experts of taxation to make use of tax treaties as
an instrument for a fairer allocation of taxing powers and co-operation between
developing and developed countries in order to allow both to preserve the integrity
of their respective taxable base in the era of global fiscal transparency.
This paper aims at considering whether the shared allocation of taxing powers
can be reshaped in a way that allows the developing country to have a fair share
of the revenue originated from the exploitation of its territory (Benshalom (2010),
Brauner (2010), Brooks (2009)). The goal of the joint legal and economic analysis
is to secure for each developing country a sound and sustainable tax policy, based
on the certainty of financial resources, sourced within the same country, consis-
tently with the national policy objectives of such country and without external
interferences (Brauner (2010), Christians (2010), Dagan (2010)).
From a legal perspective, states are free to decide whether or not to conclude
a tax treaty. However, if a treaty exists, the contracting states are obliged to
execute it in good faith, in compliance with the requirements of the Vienna Con-
vention on the Law of Treaties. Therefore, insofar as a treaty exists and includes
a clause on the exchange of information, the supply of information will be an
ordinary consequence of the obligation to execute the treaty in good faith. Never-
theless, some years ago the OECD has clarified that requests for information not
duly backed up by a precise documentation gathered in the framework of a pre-
liminary auditing activity are to be regarded as fishing expedition and thus do not
imply any obligation for the requested contracting state to supply the information.
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From an economic perspective, information asymmetries as the one described
above, where a developing country will have information on firms of developed
countries can be solved by giving the developing country the right incentives to
share this information. The key point of the analysis carried out here is to ef-
fectively implement these information sharing theories into tax treaties. In these
theories information is considered a tradable good, and thus revenue sharing in-
evitably will come alongside the exchange of information. Until now such (eco-
nomic) theories have found a limited attention among legal experts of taxation.
Within theoretical economics, some papers have analyzed the problem of infor-
mation sharing and treaty in the issue of capital income taxation. Bacchetta &
Espinosa (2000) have shown that information exchange can be supported only if
governments interact repeatedly. Huizinga & Nielsen (2003) focus on the existence
of bank profits to explain why countries might have an incentive to withhold in-
formation. Bank profits depend on the quantity of investments in a given country;
hence, tax authorities have an incentive to withhold information. In a repeated
version of the game, however, the authors show that information exchange can be
sustained as an equilibrium if the discount factor is sufficiently small.
More particularly, Keen & Ligthart (2006) have identified the three main ob-
stacles for information sharing. First, they mention that national tax authorities
must have the legal right to share their information with other countries, which
is, given the sensibility of the information, not straightforward. Second, similarly
to Huizinga & Nielsen (2003), national authorities must be given the right to gain
access to information residing with non-governmental institutions, such as banks.
Here, too, bank secrecy laws may prevent the relevant disclosure of information.
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Third, these institutions must possess the right information in an accessible form.
In a parallel paper, Keen & Ligthart (2007) apply the concept of information
exchange to the EU savings directive. They compare a scenario without informa-
tion exchange to a situation with the exchange of information, where a country
can unilaterally set a withholding tax to retain part of the tax revenues. Whilst
they do not explicitly state it in their paper, the model could be used to analyze
the benefits of signing a tax treaty with revenue sharing and information exchange,
and can thus be considered a special case of the analysis carried out here.
The first empirical application that investigates the motives for countries to sign a
tax treaty has been carried out by Voget et al. (2011). They find that apart from
reducing or eliminating crossborder double taxation, tax treaties are also signed
to obtain a legal instrument for the exchange of tax information. In this respect,
this last paper provide evidence for the theory presented in this paper.
The current concern to move toward global fiscal transparency has increased the
general awareness of the importance to secure an effective exchange of informa-
tion through tax treaties. Therefore, regardless of whether tax treaties in fact
affect FDI, this study aims at establishing a fair and effective exercise of the tax-
ing sovereignty on the basis of tax treaties in relations with developing countries
through a mechanism that pursues an effective exchange of information.
The authors regard tax treaties as the only instrument through which developed
countries can obtain the sufficient and objectively reliable information for exercis-
ing their sovereignty on revenue from developing countries (see Christians (2005)).
However, developing countries not necessarily dispose of the relevant infrastruc-
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ture and auditing system for supplying that information, which also entails relevant
costs for them. Furthermore, insofar as the tax treaty flow of information does not
work properly, developed countries find themselves in a similar situation to that
arising in the absence of a tax treaty. Accordingly, for instance, they would be
unable to check whether transfer pricing within multinational groups effectively
corresponds to the function performed by companies in developing countries in
respect of income sourced in those countries. In such cases, firms may more easily
hide all or a part of their revenues.
This paper elaborates a model for achieving a system that allows for an effective
and sustainable exchange of information in situations with unidirectional flows of
income and capital, assuming this as the situation most frequently occurring in
relations with developing countries. The analysis also takes into account the pos-
sible impact of an effective exchange of information on the mobility of investment
by multinational enterprises at the international level, assuming two scenarios in
which firms respectively (i) can and (ii) cannot move to other developing countries.
The mechanism contemplated in this study allocates taxing powers in a way that
makes it affordable for developing countries to sustain the costs of an effective
auditing carried out at the standards required by global fiscal transparency (and
in certain cases even to introduce such a system of auditing) and exercise their tax
sovereignty in compliance with their own policy. The allocation of taxing powers
allows one contracting state (normally the developed country) to tax the income
up to arm’s length value and the other contracting state (normally the developing
country) to tax the remaining part of the income2.
2A good example of this is the predetermined mechanism currently applicable on a unilateral
basis for determining transfer pricing in the Brazilian tax system.
7
In the following, we will present the design for a modern and fair tax treaty. The
treaty is modern in the sense that it takes information sharing between contracting
states seriously. It is fair in the sense that it will comprise revenue sharing of tax
revenues collected by the developed country. We will assume that both contracting
states are small, so that strategic considerations to change tax rates are absent,
and we can therefore treat tax rates as given. For the sake of simplicity we also
assume that governments are Leviathan, and maximize government revenues.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we will discuss the situa-
tion if firms are immobile. Though this scenario may not be realistic, it is simple
and yet permits us to show all the main results. We will relax this assumption
in section 3. Within each section, we will need to solve four distinguished cases,
depending on whether a treaty exits or not, and whether the developing coun-
try audits firms and gathers the necessary information for information sharing or
not. We will describe the benchmark case without a treaty in the first subsection.
Here will assume that the developing country adopts the tax credit method, and
unilaterally allows full deduction of all tax payments to the developing state. In
the second subsection, we will discuss the alternative case of a treaty, where we
assume that countries split the tax base according to the arm’s length transfer
pricing principle. In order to obtain information about its taxpayers from the
developing country, the developed country may be willing to share part of its tax
revenues, and we will indicate the range of revenue sharing where a tax treaty is
feasible.
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2 No firm relocation
We consider n ∈ <+ identical multinational firms that produce a fixed quantity,
q, of a homogeneous good in a developing country U . We assume, for the ease ex-
position, that firms sell the q goods in a developed country D at a price pd ∈ <+.3
The sales price pd is constant and known to both countries. We will normalize
pd = 1.
Firms produce with constant marginal costs c˜i. These costs, by hypothesis, are
stochastic and unknown to both countries. For the sake of simplicity we assume
that each c˜i is a random variable which can assume two values: high
(
with prob-
ability ρ ∈ [0, 1]) or low (with probability (1− ρ)), i.e. c˜i ∈ {cl, ch} 4. Note that
the developed country cannot observe the true realization of individual production
cost c˜i, but knows the probability ρ, so that it can foreseen both the amount of
firms producing with a low and high marginal costs.
As quantity neither influences marginal costs nor the sales price, we will assume
that each firm produces exactly one unit of the good, q = 1 without loss of gener-
ality. Expected gross operating profits of firms are therefore given by pii = 1 − c,
where c = E(c˜i) = ρch+ (1− ρ)cl. In the absence of a tax audit system, firms can
claim any reasonable cost to either country 5.
Both countries can and - in the absence of a tax treaty - will tax each firm i ’s
global income pii. In particular, D can levy a corporate income tax on revenues in
D even in absence of a subsidiary. We thus exclude headquarter shopping. Finally,
3We assume that consumers in D are immobile.
4with 0 < cl < ch < pd = 1.
5In our case, firms can claim at most costs of ch.
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we assume that there are no firms that produce in D and sell in U .
The developing country U can learn the actual realization of each firm’s c˜i bearing
a (sunk) cost M(n), with ∂M(.)/∂n > 0. We assume that there are fixed costs
of implanting a tax audit system, M(0) > 0. The developed country D cannot
observe or learn the true realization of c˜i and must therefore trust either the firm
or the developing country U ’s claim.
2.1 No Treaty
In the absence of a tax treaty and firm relocation, the developing country must
still decide whether to implement a tax audit system and thereby reveal informa-
tion about its resident firms, in particular about their true costs of production.
The developing country U will decide to audit if and only if tax revenues with
implementation of an audit system, that we denote with T nau , are (weakly) greater
than tax revenues without audit, T nnu ,
T nau = ntu(1− c)−M(n) ≥ ntu(1− ch) = T nnu (1)
where tu ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate in country U . This condition is satisfied if and
only if audit costs are (weakly) inferior to the tax revenue gain. Formally,
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯) (2)
If no treaty is signed and therefore no information is exchanged, country D has
to rely on each firm i’s declaration about costs, irrespective of the implementation
of an audit system in the developing country U . Since the developed country D
does not have the necessary information and no way to procure it, all firms will
declare high costs i.e. ci = ch ∀i ∈ n and will deduct taxes payed in country U
that depends on the implementation decision of country U .
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In the absence of a tax audit system in the developing country, both countries
will tax the same tax base, and tax revenues in country D will equal,
T nnd = n(td − tu)(1− ch) (3)
where td ∈ [0, 1] is the tax rate in country D. By contrast, if U has implemented a
tax audit system, firms will declare true costs to country U and therefore deduct
higher taxes in country D. In this case tax revenues will equal,
T nad = n(td − tu)(1− ch)− ntu(ch − c¯) (4)
In the absence of audit, firms hide part of their revenues and therefore evade an
amount of taxes equal to ntd(ch − c).
Without an audit system we define the global tax revenues as:
T nn = T nnu + T
nn
d = ntd(1− ch) (5)
In the presence of audit, the global tax revenues is:
T na = T nau + T
na
d = ntd(1− ch)−M(n) (6)
It is important to understand that without a treaty the global taxation is a de-
creasing function of the audit sunk cost M(n).
2.2 A Treaty
Tax treaties with developing countries typically follow the UN model tax treaty,
where countries agree to exchange information and eliminate double taxation by
splitting firm revenues according to arm’s length transfer pricing rules. The arms
length principle defines the just transfer price as average production costs plus a
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mark-up. We will assume that this transfer price equals αc˜i, where α > 1.
Both countries will loose part of the tax base when signing a treaty. The developed
country D could gain from a double tax treaty if this reveals true production costs
of firms. However, the developing country U would unconditionally loose from
a tax treaty, as it could observe true production costs even in the absence of a
treaty through auditing. Developing countries will therefore only voluntarily sign
tax treaties if an element of revenue sharing is included in the treaty. In order to
obtain a voluntary agreement, the developed economy, D, will propose a compen-
sation fee f for the revelation of information about every firm. We assume that
the developed country will offer fl if revealed costs of the firm are low and fh if
revealed costs were high.
The timing is as follows: first the developed country D chooses and announces
fh and fl
6. Then the developing country U decides whether to sign the treaty
or not. Finally, after realization of c˜i (which is not observable by the developed
country), if U signed the contract, it audits the firms, collects taxes if any and pays
η ·fh+(n−η)fl (where η ∈ [0, n] is the number of firms whose actual ci = cl) to D.
In order to induce U to sign the treaty and to give a true declaration about the
actual realization of each ci, the developed country D needs to choose the lump
sum fee vector f according to the following condition:
1. Incentive compatibility (IC) When a state piη
7 actually happened, the tax
revenues of the developing country when it declares piη must be (weakly)
6So fh ≤ fl
7In this state of the world just η firms make a low revenue while the others (n− η) make the
high one.
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greater then its tax revenues when it declares pij for all j ∈ [0, n] different
from η;
2. Participation constraint (PC) the expected tax revenues of the developing
country when it accepts the treaty must be (weakly) greater than what it
gets when it refuses.
Suppose that D sets fh 6= fl, then U has an incentive to misreport the cor-
rect transfer price in order to make an unfair profit. So, in order to satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint (IC) and then give the incentive to share the cor-
rect information to U , the developed country D has to set a unique fee f = fl = fh.
In order to satisfy the participation constraint (PC) the choice of f depends on
whether in the absence of a treaty the developing country audits or not, equation
(2). We analyze in the following before if condition (2) is satisfied and in the
following if it is not.
2.2.1 A treaty with audit already in place
If the tax revenue gain is (weakly) greater than audit costs, condition (2), then
implementing a monitoring system does not depend on the treaty since it will be
implemented anyway. If this is the case then the developing country U will sign
the treaty if tax revenues plus revenue sharing nf ta exceeds tax revenues in the
absence of a treaty,
T tau = ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) + nf ta ≥ T nau (7)
The previous equation is satisfied if and only if the tax revenue loss of the reduced
tax base audit costs are (weakly) inferior to the tax revenue gain. Formally, the
PC condition is satisfied iff,
f ta
u
= tu(1− αc) ≤ f ta (8)
13
where f ta
u
is the minimum level of revenue sharing for which country U with an
audit system will be willing to sign the treaty.
The developed country D will sign the treaty when audit was already in place
if and only if tax revenues it receives with the treaty, T tad , are greater than tax
revenues if it does not sign,
T tad = ntd(1− αc)− nf ta ≤ n(td − tu)(1− ch)− ntu(ch − c¯) = T nad (9)
This gives the maximum fee the developed country is willing to pay,
f
ta
d = td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯) ≥ f ta (10)
where f
ta
d is the maximum level of revenue sharing for which country D will be
willing to sign the treaty with a developing country with an audit system.
A treaty is feasible if and only if condition 8 and 10 are both satisfied, i.e.
f ta
u
≤ f ta ≤ f tad .
Given eqaution 6 and the global taxation with the treaty:
T ta = ntd(1− αc) + ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) (11)
we find that T ta = T na + nf
ta
d − nf tau which shows that a treaty is feasible iff the
total tax revenues is increasing with the treaty. 8
2.2.2 A treaty initially without audit
If audit costs are greater than the tax revenue gain, U will not implement the
audit system in the absence of the treaty. This means that in the absence of a
8We discuss under which conditions a treaty increase the tax revenue in the paragraph 2.2.3.
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treaty it will get a payoff of T nnu , defined in equation (1) above, since each firm i
will declare high costs ch, and it will get T
tn
u if it signs the treaty. The problem of
the developing country U consists of choosing whether to sign the treaty or not in
order to maximize its tax revenues. It will accept the treaty iff:
T tnu = ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) + nf tn ≥ ntu(1− ch) = T nnu (12)
The previous condition is satisfied if and only if the fee plus the net tax revenues
gain are (weakly) greater than the cost of the audit system, or
f tn
u
= tu(1− αc) + M(n)
n
− tu(ch − c¯) ≤ f tn (13)
where f tn
u
is the minimum level of revenue sharing for which country U without
an audit system will be willing to sign the treaty.
In addition to the compensation of the loss of tax base as in condition (8) above,
the developed economy must now also compensate the developing economy for the
implementation of a tax audit system, which is the last part of the above condition
(13) and replicates condition (2).
Similarly as above, the developed country D will sign the treaty when audit
was not already in place if and only if the tax revenues it receives with the treaty
exceed tax revenues without the treaty,
T nnd = n(td − tu)(1− ch) ≤ ntd(1− αc)− nf tn = T tnd (14)
which leads to,
f
tn
d = td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch) ≥ f tn (15)
where f
tn
d is the maximum level of revenue sharing for which country D will be
willing to sign the treaty with a developing country without an audit system.
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The first term is the tax gain when a treaty is signed. The second by contrast is
the tax revenue loss due to the ceasure of taxing rights to the developing country
U . The two conditions for the developed economy, equations (10) and (15), differ
only by the amount tu(ch − c). If no audit system was in place before the treaty,
the developed country can offer a lower compensation for the developing country
U , as it can fully appropriate the higher tax revenues of the developing country U
resulting from auditing.
A treaty is feasible if and only if conditions 13 and 15 are both satisfied, i.e.
f tn
u
≤ f tn ≤ f tnd .
As before if the above condition is met then the total tax revenues is increas-
ing with the treaty. Let us define the global taxation with the treaty as:
T tn = ntd(1− αc) + ntu(α− 1)c−M(n) (16)
and recalling equation 5 we get T tn = T nn + nf
tn
d − nf tnu .
2.2.3 Discussion
Jointly equations (10) and (15) give the maximum level of revenue sharing still
acceptable for the developed economy D. Equations (8) and (13) define the min-
imum level of revenue sharing that the developing country U is willing to accept.
Equations (10) and (8) hold for cases where an audit system is already in place,
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch− c¯), whereas equations (15) and (13) hold otherwise. We can plot
these conditions in a graph in the f to M(n)
n
space.
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We can define the difference b between the revenue sharing fee offered by the
developed country and the revenue sharing fee requested by the developing country
as
b = f
ta
d − f tau = td(ch − αc) + tu(α− 1)c (17)
This indicates the bargaining space that the two countries have in case an audit
system is already in place. We find that a tax treaty can be welfare improving for
both countries if b ≥ 0. Except for the unlikely case that the average arm’s length
price exceeds the maximum cost by a very large amount, we can ensure that a tax
treaty is possible. Moreover, we can show that in this case, a tax treaty can also as-
sist in the implementation of a tax audit system if f
tn
d −f tau ⇔ td ≥ tu. Finally, note
that if unit auditing costs exceed the bargaining space M(n)/n ≥ b ⇔ f tn
u
− f tnd ,
and no voluntary treaty is feasible.
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The transfer price alpha is decided by international law and therefore given. If al-
pha were freely choosable by both contracting parties, we could identify the lowest
transfer price for which the developing country is indifferent between signing the
treaty or not:
α =
 1c if M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c) with audit system1
c
(
1 + M(n)
ntu
+ c− ch
)
if M(n) ≥ ntu(ch − c) without audit system
(18)
As can be noticed above if the developing country has already an audit system
this optimal choice depends on the developing country tax base tu. This feature
hampers the possibility to set a unique international standard transfer price.
The model implies an unambiguously positive level of revenue sharing. The com-
pensation will therefore be the result of a bargaining process and - depending on
the bargaining power of the two parties - fall in between the minimum level of
revenue sharing required by the developing economy U and the maximum level of
revenue sharing offered by the developed country D.
Interestingly, a treaty can stimulate a developing country to introduce a tax audit
system together with a tax treaty, even if initially an audit system is too expensive
to be implemented. As long as the tax level is given the treaty acts as it increases
the tax rate in U and the tax base in D. Moreover a treaty can end the evasion
phenomenon since firms will declare truthfully. Obviously, there will be no treaty
with developing countries that exhibit excessive audit costs.
We were able to show under which conditions countries are willing to sign a tax
treaty voluntarily where they truthfully exchange information. We have been able
to prove that such treaties will only come to place if the country in need of in-
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formation is willing to share a nonzero part of these additional revenues with the
other country. We were also able to show that the conclusion of a treaty can in-
duce the developing country to implement a tax audit system. In the next section,
we will analyze whether these conclusions hold under the obvious possibility that
firms may leave (or enter) a country that has just signed a treaty.
3 Relocation decision
Capital is mobile internationally, and firms can relocate their production at will
to any third country upon bearing a relocation cost k. For simplicity, we assume
that third countries levy the same tax rate tu as the developing country U under
consideration. Such a common tax rate can be the outcome of tax competition.
3.1 No treaty
First, suppose that the developing country has neither a tax treaty nor a tax audit
system. Then the firm will claim as before high costs in both countries and be
taxed according to the global income principle, yielding expected profits of
pinns = (1− c)− td(1− ch) (19)
in case it decides to stay. Profits are given by revenues (normalized to unity) minus
expected production costs c, and minus tax payments on declared profits to the
developed country D, since taxes payed in U can be deducted. Suppose, now, that
firms can move paying a reallocation cost k. The profit of a single firm in case it
decides to move to another country without audit and treaty will be
pinnn = pinns − k (20)
In the absence of neither a proper tax audit nor a tax treaty, the foreign tax credit
method impedes firms to relocate as profits of relocating firms (20) are strictly
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lower than profits of remaining firms (19), pinnn ≤ pinns. By the same token, the
foreign tax credit method also impedes tax competition between developing coun-
tries, as their respective tax rates are irrelevant for the locational decision of foreign
firms. Tax revenues in the developed and the developing country respectively are
T nnsu = ntu(1− ch) and T nnsd = n(td − tu)(1− ch).
Second, suppose now that the developing economy implements a tax audit sys-
tem, but does not communicate the findings to the developed economy due to
the lack of a treaty. If the developed country D offers tax deductions following
the foreign tax credit method, firms can deduct all the taxes payed in U . Prof-
its in the case firms do not relocate are identical to the case in the absence of
auditing (19), pinas = pinns. Profits in the case firms relocate are also identical
to the case in the absence of auditing (20), pinan = pinnn. Firms will again decide
to remain in the developing country U given (weakly) positive moving costs, k ≥ 0.
Tax revenues in the developed country now differ since firms deduct a higher
amount of taxes. Hence T nasd = ntd(1−ch)−ntu(1− c¯), whereas for the developing
country they change to T nasu = ntu(1− c¯)−M(n). As opposed to the case without
auditing, the developed country D will now receive lower tax revenues as firms
will now deduct higher tax payments to the developing country U of the amount
tu(ch − c). The developing country by contrast gains these tax revenues, but has
to pay auditing costs of M(n). The developing country U prefers to implement a
tax audit system if T nasu ≥ T nnsu , or
M(n) ≤ ntu(ch − c¯). (21)
This means that an audit system will be implemented if the tax gain is greater
than auditing costs.
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3.2 A Treaty
As in the absence of a relocation decision, we will consider a treaty with infor-
mation exchange and revenue sharing. Note that in the absence of auditing, the
developed economy will not benefit from a treaty, and will therefore not be willing
to share tax revenues. This case is therefore identical to the no treaty/no audit
case above.
With the conclusion of a tax treaty, firms are now aware that information about
their true cost structure will be shared with the developed economy. By contrast,
a treaty eliminates double taxation according to the global income principle with
full foreign tax credit, and firms will now declare part of their profits in the devel-
oping country U , which might offer lower tax rates. If the prior effect dominates,
firms can expect to pay higher taxes and may consider relocation.
In order to prevent capital flight, the developing country U may consider the
possibility to pay a subsidy, s, in order to induce firms to stay. We can think of
these subsidies either as a reduction in the tax rate offered to firms considering
relocation, where the effective tax rate will be τu = tu − s/(αc¯ − c¯), or a transfer
in kind (e.g. infrastructure), which would reduce production costs. In either case,
the subsidy given is a form of tax competition. Profits in case the firm leaves are
given by equation (20) above, whereas if the firm remains they are given by
pitas = (1− c¯)− tu(α− 1)c¯− td(1− αc¯) + s (22)
The optimal subsidy to firms now equals
s ≥ tu(α− 1)c¯+ td(ch − αc¯)− k (23)
The first part represents taxes payed in U , whereas the second term controls for
the once evaded taxes in D, and the last part is the moving cost. Firms can
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therefore claim all taxes paid to the developing country U short of relocation costs
k, and will receive the additional taxes paid to the developed country D back from
the developing country. With very high relocation costs, this subsidy could in
theory by negative, and developing countries could in principle appropriate these
locational rents. Substituting subsidies from above, we find that tax revenues will
equal
T tasu = nf
tas
u
+ nk − ntd(ch − αc¯)−M(n) (24)
Note that tax revenue depend on tax rates in the developed economy due to the
subsidy. The developed economy will revive revenues equal to
T tasd = ntd(1− αc¯)− nf
tas
d (25)
3.3 Discussion
Once again, we have to distinguish two cases indicated by condition (21), whether
audit is already in place before signing the treaty, M(n) ≤ ntu(ch− c¯), or not. On
the one hand, if audit was already in place before signing the treaty, the developing
country will accept the treaty iff tax revenues under a treaty exceed tax revenues
without a treaty, T tasu ≥ T nasu or
f tas
u
≥ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯)− k
The developed country by contrast will accept the treaty iff tax revenues under a
treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty, T tasd ≥ T nasd or
f
tas
d ≤ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− c¯)
Note that f tas
u
= f
tas
d − k. Hence the developed country D will be willing to
offer a revenue sharing fee that will exceed the revenue sharing fee requested by
the developing country U for any nonnegative relocation costs k ≥ 0. The treaty
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surplus b that was generated in the absence of firm relocation is now entirely
absorbed by firms through subsidies. By contrast, the relocation costs k generates
a different rent that opens a new bargaining space k. Let us define global taxation
as the sum of both countries’ tax revenues: T nas = T nasd +T
nas
u = ntd(1−ch)−M(n)
is the global taxation if any treaty is not signed and T tas = T tasd + T
tas
u = ntd(1−
ch) + nk −M(n). So:
T tas ≥ T nas → k > 0
This means that the global taxation is increasing in the treaty if and only if there
exists a positive cost for each firm to move.
On the other hand, if auditing was initially not in place and condition (21) was
not satisfied, M(n) > ntu(ch − c¯), the developing country will accept the treaty
if and only if tax revenues under a treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty,
T tnsu = T
tas
u ≥ T nnsu or
f tns
u
≥ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch) + M(n)
n
− k
The developed country by contrast will accept the treaty iff tax revenues under a
treaty exceed tax revenues without a treaty, T tnsd = T
tas
d ≥ T nasd or
f
tns
d ≤ td(ch − αc) + tu(1− ch)
The minimum revenue sharing fee acceptable for the developing country will be
lower than the maximum revenue sharing fee offered by the developed country if
M(n) ≤ nk − ntd(1− ch)
Together with condition (21), This identifies the space were a treaty is feasible
even if there was no auditing initially, namely when relocation costs are high, or
k ≥ td(1− ch) + tu(ch − c¯)
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As before the global taxation is T nns = T nnsd + T
nns
u = ntd(1− ch) if any treaty is
not signed and if not is T tns = T tnsd + T
tns
u = ntd(1− ch) + nk −M(n). So:
T tas ≥ T nas → k > M(n)
n
This means that the global taxation is increasing with the treaty if and only if the
cost for each firm to move is greater than the cost for the developing country to
audit it.
Notice that for tax rates in the developed economy exceeding tax rates in the
developing economy, td > tu, the subsidy is increasing in the arm’s length pricing
mark-up α. Developing countries need not pay a subsidy if the mark-up is defined
according to
α− 1 = td(ch − c)− k
(td − tu)c
Substituting the minimum subsidy feasible from equation (23) into the profit func-
tion (22), we find that net profits will equal pitas = (1− c¯)−td(1−ch)−k. Together,
the developed and the developing country can levy at most the developed countries
tax rate on the minimum declarable taxbase 1− ch and skim off relocation costs.
(Tax) revenues in the developing economy will consist of profit taxation of firms,
subsidies to firms, revenue sharing from the developed country, and audit costs.
4 Conclusions
This paper has departed from the observation that global income taxation in the
country of residence is a global legal dogma of international taxation. We have
questioned this dogma from the perspective of relations with developing countries
from a legal and economic perspective, and made a modern and fair proposal for
tax treaties. We have shown under which conditions a developing and a developed
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country will voluntarily sign a tax treaty where information is exchanged truthfully
and when they should share revenues. Moreover, we have demonstrated how the
conclusion of a tax treaty can assist in the implementation of a tax audit system.
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